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Abstract
Ralph Miliband’s influential Marxist critique of Parliamentary Socialism (1961)
depicted a Labour Party that had condemned itself to futility by its dogmatic
commitment to parliamentary methods. By contrast, Social Democratic writers
such as Ben Pimlott have argued that Labour’s reformism secured concrete gains,
whilst accepting the premise that the party’s electoralism/parliamentarism went
unquestioned at the time. Both sides are right insofar as no group within the
party suggested abandoning parliamentary methods. What has been forgotten,
however, is that there was considerable debate after 1918 about how Parliament
should be used. Not only was Labour’s commitment to Parliament challenged by
other parties, which alleged extremism and disregard of the rhetorical conven-
tions of the Commons, but Labour itself accused its opponents of riding
roughshod over parliamentary liberties. Thus, the decision of some left-wing MPs
to use parliamentary disruption tactics in their quest to present themselves as
spokesmen of the unemployed was depicted by them as a proper use of the
Commons to challenge capitalism and by Conservatives as proof of Labour’s
innate extremism and unfitness to govern. Issues of class were central to these
understandings, and gender was also important. This article examines the
arguments about Parliament and parliamentary methods that were conducted
within and without the Commons, often through symbolic manifestations such as
rowdy ‘demonstrations’ within the Chamber. It concludes that the inter-war
experience taught Labour not the possibilities of Parliament but its limits.
The inter-war years were a rollercoaster ride for the Labour Party. In the
years of flux from 1918 to 1931, the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP)
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experienced rapid changes in size and personnel. It moved from the
position of an embattled band of comrades to party of government and
then back again, forcing the Labour cohort in the Commons to reinvent
its role repeatedly. Moreover, Labour’s constitutional credentials and
‘fitness to govern’ were under consistent attack from its opponents,
making the question of how the party should use Parliament inevitably
controversial.
Yet, historians across the ideological spectrum have frequently
presented Labour’s relationship with Parliament as relatively uncom-
plicated. Ralph Miliband’s influential Marxist critique Parliamentary
Socialism (first published in 1961) depicted a Labour Party that had
condemned itself to futility by its dogmatic commitment to reformist
parliamentary methods. He argued: ‘the leaders of the Labour Party
have always rejected any kind of action which fell, or which appeared
to them to fall, outside the framework and conventions of the
parliamentary system . . . it has been a party deeply imbued with
parliamentarism’.1 From a right-wing Conservative perspective,
Maurice Cowling made the remarkably similar argument that
Labour’s leaders, conceiving themselves as sober, moderate parliamen-
tary politicians, posed no threat to the system: ‘even when they said the
opposite, they assumed that the political and social system could not be
overturned and that it was impossible to establish a hegemony of the
poor over the rich’.2 Less idealistic than Miliband and less cynical than
Cowling, Ben Pimlott’s work demonstrated a Social Democratic belief in
the ability of reformism to secure concrete gains; but he too accepted
the premise that ‘Labour’s Parliamentarism . . .has not merely been
an orientation or predilection; it has been the very reason for its
existence’.3
In one sense such claims are unarguable: it is quite right to suggest
that Labour leaders never advocated methods ‘which appeared to them
to fall’ beyond parliamentary conventions. At the same time, they beg
some very important questions, not least, did everyone else agree that
their behaviour was irreproachably parliamentary? These claims also
appear to rest on the assumption that the ‘conventions of the
parliamentary system’ were understood by contemporaries in the
same way, a way similar, in effect, to more modern understandings.
In other words, Parliament and the range of possible techniques for
making use of it are largely taken for granted; it is imagined that
1 R. Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour (2nd edn,
London, 1972), 13. Miliband has found many followers, e.g. D. Coates, The Labour Party
and the Struggle for Socialism (Cambridge, 1975); and G. Elliott, Labourism and the English
Genius: The Strange Death of Labour England? (London, 1993).
2 M. Cowling, The Impact of Labour 1920–1924: The Beginning of Modern British Politics
(Cambridge, 1971), 11.
3 B. Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s (Cambridge, 1977), 196.
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everyone knows what ‘parliamentary methods’ are and were and that
there is little ground for argument on the topic. The effect of this has
been to shut down debate on the question of what Labour thought
about how Parliament should be used, and above all what they thought
it was for. Although there has been plenty of discussion of the PLP in
terms of its ideology and effectiveness, there has been little exploration
of how it actually operated within the Commons and what this meant
for wider understandings of the constitution.4 Nor has it been
systematically examined in the longer-term context of parliamentary
behaviour, notably the efforts at obstruction by the Irish Parliamentary
Party (IPP) in the Parnellite period and by the disruption caused by
Conservatives over Home Rule before 1914. In the 1920s, Labour’s
enemies presented the party as disrespectful of Commons tradition; but
whereas Labour eschewed complete obstruction in the style of the Irish,
it attempted to justify some of the ‘scenes’ that it did create with
reference to Edwardian Tory precedents. What its opponents painted as
‘rowdyism’ it presented as established constitutional action. The issue
of social class, moreover, was central to understandings of what did or
did not constitute ‘respectable’ parliamentary behaviour.
There are some exceptions to the historical neglect of the problem
but they are, for the most part, rather limited. Anthony Wright has
presented the relationship of British socialists to the constitution as a
‘history of satisfaction’, but he does allow that ‘behind the celebration
of constitutional orthodoxies there has also been a history of heresies
and discontents’; and more recently Miles Taylor has shown persua-
sively that Labour’s interest in constitutional and constitutional reform
was more considerable than has been generally thought.5 Philip
Williamson has made a valuable study of Labour’s attitudes to the
House of Lords.6 For his part, Miliband wrote of the importance of ‘the
climate of the House of Commons and the ‘aristocratic embrace’ in
taming so many Labour members’, but he showed little interest in the
mechanics of the party’s parliamentary actions.7 David Marquand has
acknowledged that there were different forms of Labour parliamen-
tarianism, with left-wingers favouring ‘a more aggressive, and above all
4 Thus, Richard Heffernan’s account of the PLP is not illuminating on Labour’s
parliamentary technique: ‘Leaders and Followers: The Politics of the Parliamentary
Labour Party’, in B. Brivati and R. Heffernan, eds, The Labour Party: A Centenary History
(Basingstoke, 2000), 246–67.
5 A. Wright, ‘British Socialists and the British Constitution’, Parliamentary Affairs 43
(1990), 322–40, at 323, 325; M. Taylor, ‘Labour and the Constitution’, in D. Tanner et al.,
eds, Labour’s First Century (Cambridge, 2000), 151–80.
6 P. Williamson, ‘The Labour Party and the House of Lords, 1918–1931’, Parliamentary
History 10 (1991), 317–41.
7 Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, 96. For a critique of the ‘aristocratic embrace’
thesis, see N. Owen, ‘MacDonald’s Parties: The Labour Party and the ‘Aristocratic
Embrace’, 1922–31’, Twentieth Century British History 18 (2007), 1–53.
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a morally more intransigent’ version.8 More substantively, in his
seminal book on the period, David Howell has noted correctly that
during the 1920s ‘the issue of parliamentary strategy remained
contested’ and that some MPs, eager to articulate the plight of their
poverty-stricken constituents, ‘felt that radicalism should be expressed
through parliamentary scenes whether planned in advance or arising
from the cut and thrust of debate’.9 However, Howell’s brief treatment
presents the issue as somewhat marginal, as does Matthew Worley’s
subsequent work. Worley writes that although parts of the Independent
Labour Party (ILP) tried to exploit Commons ‘scenes’, ‘the majority of
the PLP adhered to MacDonald’s lead, seeking to familiarize themselves
with ‘‘parliamentary ways’’ in an attempt to demonstrate Labour’s
capabilities’.10 In effect, this view amounts to a retrospective endorse-
ment of MacDonald’s own boast, made privately in 1923, that he was
‘bringing the wild socialist Labour members to heel’.11
There is no need to reject MacDonald’s self-assessment entirely: his
intentions were undoubtedly as he stated them in that instance. Yet, the
effect of accepting at face value his own account of his attitude to
Parliament has been, paradoxically, that we know very little about it.
The conventional wisdom sees Labour accepting his version of
parliamentarism; but what this parliamentarism actually was is left
vague. Sometimes it seems from the existing historiography that what
MacDonald did was parliamentarism; and that parliamentarism was
whatever MacDonald did. However, the question of Labour’s attitude
to Parliament is much more interesting and complex than the standard
picture implies.12 The party never sought to do away with Parliament,
of course; but this did not necessarily imply an unquestioned faith in
the institution as it stood. From the beginning of the period, Labour’s
attitude to Parliament contained ambiguities (and variations between
groups and individuals) that its enemies could exploit. Its commitment
to Parliament was challenged by other parties, which alleged extremism
and disregard of the rhetorical conventions of the Commons. Labour
reacted, certainly, by affirming its parliamentarism, but it did so in part
by attacking the parliamentarist credentials of its opponents. In other
words, rather than submitting passively to supposedly accepted norms,
8 D. Marquand, The Progressive Dilemma: From Lloyd George to Kinnock (London,
1992), 115.
9 D. Howell, MacDonald’s Party: Labour Identities and Crisis, 1922–1931 (Oxford,
2002), 29.
10 M. Worley, Labour Inside the Gate: A History of the British Labour Party between the Wars
(London, 2005), 28.
11 Quoted in Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, 95, n. 1.
12 Similarly, some recent work has suggested that inter-war Labour was less urban
focussed and more media-savvy than traditionally thought. C. V. J. Griffiths, Labour and
the Countryside: The Politics of Rural Britain 1918–1939 (Oxford, 2007); L. Beers, Your Britain:
Media and the Making of the Labour Party (Cambridge, MA, 2010).
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the party seized and to some extent remoulded them, in an aggressive
attempt to deny the claims of Tories and Liberals to be the legitimate
custodians of parliamentary tradition. Indeed, codes of parliamentary
behaviour had always been contested, never more so than from the
late-nineteenth century onwards. This has to be seen in relation to the
changing nature of the Commons’ relationship to the people in the era
of mass enfranchisement. A. B. Cooke and John Vincent have written
that Parliament in the late nineteenth century ‘was closed to those
outside, in terms of direct access and influence: it was closed also in
that politicians were bound to see more significance in the definite
structure of relationships at Westminster, then in their contacts with the
world outside’.13 But by the inter-war period this was no longer
possible, if indeed it had ever been completely true. The individual
member sat at the nexus of high and low politics. MPs of all parties, but
especially Labour ones, were eager to prove their credentials as
hard-working constituency representatives (although this is not to say
that all MPs did so).14 From Labour’s perspective, its MPs’ increasingly
active constituency role formed part of the party’s wider claim to speak
for the people.
The contest over the place of Parliament in public life left a mixed
inheritance. On the one hand, MacDonald’s claims to have educated his
party into proper parliamentary methods were not inherently absurd,
albeit his efforts to control the ‘wild men’ at times required him to flirt
with their ideas. On the other hand, acceptance of the outward forms of
parliamentary behaviour was matched, by the 1930s, by increasing
doubts about the capacity of the ‘amazingly unbusinesslike’ parlia-
mentary machine to deliver social and economic progress in the
absence of procedural reform.15 Britain’s long 1920s—culminating in
MacDonald’s departure with the Labour split of 1931—represented less
a coming to terms with Parliament than a time of disillusionment, high
faith in its potential to attack poverty being replaced by a growing
awareness of the limits of its usefulness. This did not mean that it had
become dispensable, rather that it was now viewed increasingly
instrumentally, as the handmaiden to executive power, instead of being
valued principally as a forum for discussion and persuasion through
morally forceful speech.
That should be seen as the central point of this article. In order to
make the underlying claim clearer, it is worth emphasizing also what
13 A. B. Cooke and J. Vincent, The Governing Passion: Cabinet Government and Party
Politics in Britain 1885–86 (Brighton, 1974), 21.
14 P. G. Cambray, The Game of Politics: A Study of the Principles of British Political Strategy
(London, 1932), 8–9.
15 H. Dalton, Practical Socialism for Britain (London, 1935), 44.
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is not being argued. The existing historical paradigm is essentially a
binary one, in which Labour faced a choice between constitutional/
parliamentary/reformist methods and unconstitutional/extra-
parliamentary/revolutionary ones, and opted the former, albeit with a
few teething troubles. It is not suggested here that the choice was more
close-run than formerly thought, or that there is some plausible
counter-factual whereby Labour’s attitude might have turned out to be
very different. Nor is the purpose of the discussion of Labour’s
parliamentary behaviour merely to illustrate at greater length and in
more detail the established story of how the extremists were ‘brought to
heel’. Rather, granting that all parts of the party accepted parliamentar-
ism in some form, the intention is to explore the varieties of Labour’s
parliamentarism, together with their significance in contemporary
debate and the ways in which they changed over time. There are two
reasons for doing this. First, although the idea that Labour had any
revolutionary potential may be reasonably considered ludicrous today,
the party’s opponents either believed it or claimed to believe it in the
first years after the First World War, and the charge had an electoral
power that was demonstrated by the Zinoviev letter episode of 1924.
Labour’s attitude to the Parliament, then, was an important source of
political ammunition for the Conservatives at the time, however
contrived or artificial the resulting debates may now look. These attacks
also had an impact on how Labour chose to present itself and on the
ways in which launched assaults of its own. Secondly, equally
important questions surround the ways in which Labour became
converted to a concept of bureaucratic governance based on strong
executive action and rule by experts, and which did not so much reject
Parliament as conveniently side-step it.
In order to understand this latter point, we need to distinguish
between two types of parliamentarism. The first sees Parliament as part
of a rational public sphere, whereby the clash of ideas generates
superior conclusions. The second sees it merely as a tool for
implementing the will of the electoral majority.16 It is argued here
that although Labour never believed wholeheartedly in the first type—
of which the Liberals considered themselves the guardians—it did in
the 1920s have faith in the Commons as a venue in which the voices of
those it represented could be heard.17 This faith, however, was not
sustained beyond 1931. While continuing to pay verbal tribute to the
value of debate, the party concluded that the achievement of its
socio-economic agenda risked being prejudiced by excessive devotion
16 C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Cambridge MA, 1988), 4. This work
was first published in 1923, with a new edition appearing in 1926.
17 ‘What is Parliament For?’, The Liberal Pioneer, June 1927.
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to the principle of ‘government by discussion’.18 This growing faith in
executive action, however, was by no means unique to Labour, in an era
in which all governments presided over a shift in power away from
Parliament towards the state bureaucracy.19
The article, then, explores Labour’s attitude to Parliament from the
brief post-First World War era of ‘direct action’ to the post-MacDonald
reassessments of the 1930s, and briefly suggests some consequences
for the Attlee government of 1945–51. (The focus is on the House of
Commons, which had reinforced its position as the dominant chamber
in the Edwardian period.) It draws on evidence both of what happened
within the Commons itself and of attitudes towards Parliament that
were expressed outside. This is important because, while the Commons
can be seen as a ‘community of practice’, in which newcomers adopted
the habits of the institution through ‘situated learning’, it must be
remembered that this was learning that took place in the full glare of
national publicity.20 Therefore, the question of what Labour did within
Parliament cannot be separated from that of how Parliament itself was
argued about outside. In other words, we need to consider attitudes to
Parliament in an overall sense alongside the more specific question of
Labour’s negotiation of parliamentary conventions, protocol, and
culture. Exploring the two themes together allows us to explore the
implications of Jose´ Harris’s observation that throughout the twentieth
century ‘the party’s adherence to the orthodox principles of the British
constitution (rooted in the sovereignty of Parliament) was . . . in latent
tension with its role as a popular movement’.21 It also casts new light
on the ‘the transformation of British public politics after the First World
War’ highlighted by Jon Lawrence, whereby established politicians
sought to distance themselves from rowdy behaviour in the sphere of
extra-parliamentary politics.22
Late-nineteenth-century observers detected ‘a common understand-
ing or consensus’ between the two main British political parties
about the basic forms of government.23 Admiration for Parliament was
18 The phrase—if not the concept—was originally Walter Bagehot’s and was later
referred to by, amongst others, Harold Laski and Aneurin Bevan. N. St John Stevas, ed.,
The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot Vol. VII (London, 1974), 106–33; H. Laski, The
Foundations of Sovereignty, and Other Essays (London, 1921), 36; A. Bevan, In Place of Fear
(London, 1952), 29.
19 K. Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since
1911 (London, 1979), esp. 22, 309. For contemporary criticism (not targeted particularly at
Labour), see Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (London, 1929).
20 S. Harris, ‘Being Politically Impolite: Extending Politeness Theory to Adversarial
Political Discourse’, Discourse & Society, 12 (2001), 451–72, at 453.
21 J. Harris, ‘Labour’s Political and Social Thought’, in D. Tanner et al., eds, Labour’s
First Century (Cambridge, 2000), 8–45, at 15.
22 J. Lawrence, ‘The Transformation of British Public Politics after the First World War’,
Past & Present, 190 (2006), 185–216.
23 ‘Party Government on the Continent’, Saturday Review, 24 April 1897.
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not completely hegemonic on the left, but many of the pioneers of
the Labour Party had considerable respect for Parliament. Some of
them, including MacDonald, gained experience in mock-Westminster
‘local parliaments’—as well as in local councils, trades unions,
and other rule-bound debating fora—and thus received a grounding
in parliamentary ritual and rhetorical technique.24 Respect for and
knowledge of Parliament did not necessarily imply complete acceptance
of the ‘tardy methods’ of the Commons, though.25 The ILP was in
the vanguard of reform proposals. Fred Jowett MP became the long-
standing champion of a system whereby ministers’ work would
be carried out in conjunction with parliamentary committees, and
this did eventually become part of the ILP programme in 1926.26
And whereas this particular scheme did not achieve widespread
mainstream Labour support, this is not to say that procedural reform in
general was unpopular. As Taylor has shown, although MacDonald
rejected Jowett’s ideas, he ‘took for granted radical parliamentary
reform’ in order to deliver socialism in a more business-like and
efficient way.27
Socialist radicals wanted to win parliamentary power, but in so
doing to challenge the deferential behaviour of the existing ‘Lib-Lab’
workingmen MPs. Elected to the Commons for the first time in 1892,
Keir Hardie made a class-symbolic sartorial statement by eschewing the
typical uniform of frock coat and top hat in favour of a tweed suit and
soft cap.28 A 1906 Labour Party poster speaks of the conviction both
that it was possible to make progress by taking control of the
Commons, and that Parliament desperately needed shaking up. Figures
representing ‘Landlordism’, ‘Sweating’, and ‘Monopoly’ threaten to
tie up the vigorous Labour ‘youngster’—now that he has broken his
way into Parliament—with bonds marked ‘speechifying’, ‘formality’,
‘antiquated procedure’, etc. He responds: ‘You just wait, I still have my
axe.’29 This surprisingly violent imagery did not suggest a supine
readiness to accept the status quo.
The reality of course was rather less dramatic. It is hard to see
the Edwardian Labour Party as much more than a junior partner to
the Liberals, doing its best within the confines of the system to
24 R. McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain (Oxford, 1991), 22–3.
25 See e.g. J. Hodge, Workman’s Cottage to Windsor Castle (London, 1931), 152–3, 155–6.
26 Wright, ‘British Socialists’, 326.
27 Taylor, ‘Labour and the Constitution’, 155.
28 C. Benn, Keir Hardie (London, 1992), 92–5.
29 ‘Labour Inside the Gate’, 1906, reproduced in the frontispiece of Worley, Labour Inside
the Gate, and discussed at 20. For the significance of posters during this period, see
J. Thompson, ‘ ‘Pictorial Lies’? - Posters and Politics in Britain c.1880–1914’, Past & Present,
197 (2007), 177–210.
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achieve small-scale reforms within capitalism and within existing
parliamentary procedure. The First World War, which split the Liberals
and strengthened the unions, transformed Labour’s fortunes. Arthur
Henderson, the party’s war-time leader wrote: ‘The Labour Party can
rehabilitate parliament in the eyes of the people who have been wearied
by the unreal strife of the orthodox parties, and by the cumbrous
working of the Parliamentary machine.’30 But in the 1918 Parliament
the PLP remained weak. The uninspired chairmanship of William
Adamson (1917–21) and the rather stronger leadership of J. R. Clynes
(1921–2) were insufficient to make much impression in the face of the
enormous majority wielded by the Lloyd George coalition. According to
its critics, Labour ran its parliamentary work merely ‘as a side show to
its trade union organization’.31 In the climate of the time, it was
unsurprising that there was increasing discussion of non-parliamentary
methods and of radical alterations to Parliament. Sidney and Beatrice
Webb’s Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain (1920)
proposed abolishing the House of Lords and splitting the House of
Commons into a ‘Political Parliament’ and a ‘Social Parliament’.32 Guild
Socialism, based on the idea of ‘functional representation’, also enjoyed
a brief vogue.33 G. D. H. Cole was its chief proponent; Clement Attlee
recalled being ‘a good deal influenced’ by his writings.34 More
important in terms of the party political discourse of the time, however,
was the concept of ‘direct action’—the use of industrial power outside
Parliament for political ends.
Direct action was a short-lived phenomenon, owing to major
setbacks such as the fragmentation of the Triple Alliance of three major
unions on ‘Black Friday’ in 1921 in the face of large-scale unemploy-
ment.35 (The unions should clearly not be seen as a potential source of
a radical alternative to parliamentarism; in fact, their conservative
behavioural norms to some degree contributed to Labour’s constitu-
tionalism.) It is not even probable that direct action’s most celebrated
‘victory’—the Jolly George affair, when dockers refused to load weapons
onto a ship destined for anti-Soviet Poland—actually had an effect on
government policy.36 Nevertheless, it had the important effect of
30 A. Henderson, The Aims of Labour (London, 1918), 62.
31 Daily News, 29 July 1921, quoted in ‘The Failure of the Opposition’, The Lloyd George
Liberal Magazine, August 1921.
32 S. Webb and B. Webb, A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain
(London, 1920).
33 G. D. H. Cole, Guild Socialism (Fabian Tract No. 192) (London, 1920), 6.
34 C. R. Attlee, As It Happened (London, 1954), 53.
35 A. Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party (3rd edn, Houndmills, Basingstoke,
2008), 54–5.
36 N. Davies, ‘Lloyd George and Poland, 1919–20’, Journal of Contemporary History,
6 (1971), 132–54, at 143.
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dividing the Labour Party. Clynes argued that the use of direct action
would give other parts of the community an excuse ‘to imitate the bad
example which labour had set’.37 Henderson, another leading moderate
figure, equated direct action with Bolshevism and suggested that its
advocates were alienating voters.38 However, the proponents of direct
action were not all extremists: indeed, they included some future
stalwarts of the Attlee government. In 1919, Herbert Morrison argued
that British intervention in the Russian civil war ‘should be resisted
with the full political and industrial power of the whole Trade Union
movement’, a view endorsed by the Labour Party conference.39 In 1920,
Ernest Bevin used his position as a dockers’ leader to back the men of
the Jolly George incident, and took a leading role in creating the Council
of Action to combat intervention (although he later failed to support
strike action in defence of the miners on Black Friday).40 It should also
be noted that many advocates of direct action saw it as a complement
to parliamentary methods, not as an alternative.41 This, indeed, was
MacDonald’s formal position.
MacDonald’s short book Parliament or Revolution (1919) rejected the
latter option, as one would expect. However, it also made the more
surprising argument that direct action was theoretically permissible and
in certain conditions desirable:
I reject the argument that direct action is ‘unconstitutional’—whatever
that may mean; I deny that it is illegitimate; I do not believe that
it is inconsistent with democratic Parliamentary government; I offer
no hospitality to the views of a Leviathan State whether based upon
the will of a monarch or that of a Parliamentary majority.
There were, however, important caveats. Direct action could only be
used when Parliament had forfeited popular confidence: ‘the demand
for it can only arise when governors have created revolutionary
conditions by their stupidities or oppressions; freedom prevents its
being used for trivial grievances and forbids its becoming a regular
feature of democratic activity’. (The 1918 Parliament was widely viewed
as the illegitimate product of a rushed election in the emotional
post-Armistice atmosphere.) In effect, then, as MacDonald himself
admitted, he had in practice reached similar conclusions to the
37 Report of Proceedings at the Fifty-First Trades Union Congress (London, 1919), 338–9.
38 R. McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain (Oxford, 1991), 56–7.
39 Quoted in G. D. H. Cole, History of the Labour Party from 1914 (London, 1948), 104.
40 A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin Volume 1: Trade Union Leader 1881–1940
(London, 1960), 134–5, 178–9.
41 See e.g. D. Englander, ‘The National Union of Ex-Servicemen and the Labour
Movement, 1918–1920’, History, 76 (1991), 24–42, at 38.
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opponents of direct action even while he rejected their reasoning.42 His
argument can be read both as an opportunistic attempt to retain
influence with the Labour movement, and as an oblique attempt to
convince ‘revolutionists of the efficacy of parliamentarism’, to quote a
contemporary review.43
Attacks on Labour’s flirtation with direct action became a staple of
Liberal and Conservative attacks on its constitutional credentials.44
MacDonald’s attempts to have things both ways made him vulnerable
to the ridicule of his enemies. The Conservative magazine The Popular
View used this technique in 1922:
Parliament, he argues, must be representative. When it ceases to
be representative it is no longer Parliament. So direct action, he
says, taken against a non-representative Parliament is not anti-
Parliamentary action. Of course, he will decide when Parliament is
non-representative and so, when direct action is justified.45
However, the Conservatives themselves were susceptible to accus-
ations of double standards. According to the Daily Herald, ‘When the
Council of Action, representing the mass of the workers of this country,
did what the House of Commons ought to have done, and prevented
war with Russia, it was assailed as a wrecker of society . . .When
Mussolini actually practises Direct Action and boasts he has made a
revolution, he is styled the noblest of patriots, and all the Reactionaries
hasten to hand him bouquets.’46 Within this atmosphere, MacDonald’s
approach may have made him seem more palatable to left-wing
radicals than Henderson and Clynes were. In his (admittedly very
42 J. Ramsay MacDonald, Parliament and Revolution (Manchester, 1919), 69–84.
Quotations at 69, 74, 75. See also R. E. Dowse, ‘A Note on Ramsay MacDonald and
Direct Action’, Political Studies, 9 (1961), 306–8.
43 P. Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism, and the British Left, 1881–1924
(London, 1998), 153; R. L. Schuyler, ‘Review of Parliament and Revolution’, Political Science
Quarterly, 35 (1920), 669–71, at 671.
44 See e.g. ‘How To Get Real Progress’, in Liberal Publication Department, Pamphlets
and Leaflets for 1919 (London, 1920); ‘Vote for Colonel the Right Hon. Leslie Wilson, The
Conservative Candidate’, leaflet for the Portsmouth South by-election of 13 December
1922, Conservative Party Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford (henceforward CPA), PUB
229/1/1; ‘What I Stand for by Basil Murray Liberal Candidate’, leaflet for the St
Marylebone by-election of 30 April 1928, CPA PUB 229/1/4. It was sometimes suggested
that those Labour figures who opposed direct action did so merely for political
convenience and for the time-being only. See e.g. the cover cartoon of The Popular View,
October 1922.
45 ‘ ‘Labour’ MPs’ New Leader. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald Resumes Pre-War Post’, The
Popular View, December 1922.
46 ‘When Direct Action is ‘Patriotic’ ’, Daily Herald, 23 November 1922. Throughout the
1920s, the Conservatives were accused of unconstitutional behaviour, sometimes on
seemingly flimsy grounds. See e.g. ‘James Chuter Ede’, Labour Party leaflet for the Mitcham
by-election of 3 March 1923, CPA, PUB 229/1/1; ‘Oswald Mosley, The Labour Candidate’,
leaflet for the Smethwick by-election of 21 December 1926, CPA, PUB 229/1/3.
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bitter) memoirs, written in the aftermath of the controversial events of
1931, Philip Snowden accused him of playing up to the left-wing at this
time.47 MacDonald, like Snowden, had lost his seat in 1918, and
so, unlike Henderson and Clynes, was not a member of the PLP.
(Henderson also lost in 1918 but was returned at a by-election the
following year.) This meant that MacDonald avoided being associated
with the perceived ‘lamentable weakness of the Labour Party in the
House of Commons’.48 He himself was among the critics, writing in
Forward in 1919 of the widespread ‘feeling of Parliamentary weakness’
he had encountered amongst Labour supporters, and finding fault with
the PLP’s Commons tactics.49 He also wrote of ‘the admitted fact’ that,
in its current condition, ‘the complexity of Parliamentary representation
makes not only Parliament itself ineffective but democracy a mere tool
of capitalist dictatorship or a mere plaything in the hands of
demagogues and party managers’.50 He undoubtedly believed that,
once Labour had a majority, this would cease to be the case.51 But his
stance nonetheless appeared more radical and dynamic than that of his
rivals. Clynes dared the proponents of direct action to taunt him ‘with
being more or less of a fogey’; MacDonald made every effort to avoid
looking like one.52
This was the context for MacDonald’s defeat of Clynes for the
chairmanship of the PLP after the general election of 1922. It is well
known that he owed his narrow victory to the support of the Clydeside
group of newly elected Scottish radical MPs. This group certainly
perceived that MacDonald would be the more vigorous leader, but to
what extent were their views affected by the men’s respective attitudes
to parliamentary tactics? Under Clynes, the PLP had not been
completely quiescent. In September 1921, two Labour MPs were
ordered to withdraw from the House after accusing government MPs of
being ‘political tricksters’ and of winning ‘a victory over starving
children’, in connection with unemployment policy. Clynes then led the
rest of the party out in protest.53 He was not enthusiastic about using
47 P. Snowden, An Autobiography Volume Two, 1919–1934 (London, 1934), 574.
48 Comment of J. Paton: Independent Labour Party, Report of the Annual Conference held
at Southport, March 1921 (London, 1921), 132.
49 J. Ramsay MacDonald, ‘The Labour Party: Vandalism Triumphant’, Forward, 1
November 1919.
50 J. Ramsay MacDonald, Parliament and Democracy (London, 1920), 64. The short
chapter on ‘The Labour Government and the Constitution’ in J. H. Thomas’s
contemporaneous book When Labour Rules (London, 1920) had nothing to say about
Parliament beyond advocating an elected second chamber.
51 As MacDonald observed: ‘Get the proper Parliament, and political ‘direct action’ is
unnecessary for Labour’, Parliament and Revolution, 83.
52 Report of Proceedings at the Fifty-First Trades Union Congress, 339.
53 The two MPs were W. Thorne and J. Jones: ‘Larger Relief Demanded’, The Times, 27
October 1921.
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such methods to help the unemployed, though, recording in his
memoirs that ‘we were as yet too weak to interfere effectively on their
behalf, and our absence served us no better than our presence’. He
attributed his loss to MacDonald to the fact that the latter ‘had gained
the support of the left-wing group, who demanded more demonstra-
tions in the Commons than I was prepared to approve’.54 MacDonald
had in fact never indicated that he was in favour of such demonstra-
tions. However, at the crucial PLP meeting where the vote took place,
he appeared more inclined than his opponent to fight the Speaker’s
ruling that Labour share the Opposition front bench with the
Asquithian Liberals.55 There was, in fact, nothing more to be done
about the matter by this stage, but—although the Clydesiders’ votes
were already in the bag—the contrast between MacDonald’s fieriness
and Clynes’s complacency may have won over some who wanted to
see a new parliamentary style.
The opening of Parliament after the election—which coincided with
the arrival of an unemployed march in London—provided a major
flashpoint in the controversy over parliamentary methods. The desire of
many of the Clydesiders to present themselves as spokesmen of the
unemployed within the Commons led them to be challengingly vocal
and, when they thought it necessary, to use disruption tactics. This
contributed to an appearance of new vigour on behalf of the PLP as a
whole, and as the PLP changed so Parliament changed with it.
According to the ILP weekly The New Leader, ‘By all night sittings, by
organised guerrilla opposition, which anyone is free to call ‘‘obstruc-
tion,’’ for all we care, Labour is making it impossible to forget the
unemployed.’56 Some of the Clydesiders initially showed scant regard
for formal Commons conventions. For example, during his maiden
speech, James Maxton corrected himself for addressing a fellow MP by
name rather than constituency before adding ‘but it does not matter a
damn’.57
Yet the forceful rhetorical style of the new MPs was quite as much of
an issue as were the strict questions of protocol. To the left-wing Daily
Herald, the efforts of the incomers represented ‘a tidal wave from the
democracy of the Kingdom – the voice of the people demanding a
complete change in the system under which they suffer’.58 To the
reactionary Morning Post, by contrast, their speeches were ‘examples
of Bolshevist frightfulness well calculated for the end in view of
disgusting the ‘‘workers’’ (and everybody else) with Parliament. Even,
54 J. R. Clynes, Memoirs 1869–1924 (London, 1937), 325–6, 330.
55 D. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977), 287.
56 ‘Politics and Work’, New Leader, 15 December 1922.
57 G. Brown, Maxton (Edinburgh, 1986), 125.
58 ‘The Debate’, Daily Herald, 24 November 1922.
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when we come to think about it, the election of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald
as Leader of the Labour Party may be part of this design.’59
A more typical and more measured Conservative reaction was to
suggest that Labour MPs betrayed their ignorance of parliamentary
tradition by importing ‘leather lunged’ street-corner methods into what
ought to be a dignified setting.60 Class and gender constructions were
both at work here. Conservatives claimed that the agitational style of
the neophytes was at odds with the supposedly traditional Commons
speaking technique based on simplicity and restraint. Labour therefore
was presented as being in breach of behavioural codes that were
claimed as an eternal part of true Commons culture, but which in fact
reflected a temporally specific set of elite masculine values.61 (The
overall significance of women MPs should not be dismissed, but they
were not a major feature of contemporary debates about rhetorical
style.) Stuart Ball has accepted, too easily, that the failure of some
Labour MPs to conform was evidence of poor quality speaking on their
part.62 But those members who maintained a ‘platform’ style
represented an alternative model of masculinity, based on different
class norms, in which vehemence rather than restraint served as the
token of the required sincerity.
Nevertheless, some established Labour figures shared the
Conservative critique. Snowden recalled scathingly in his memoirs
that ‘To those of us who were well acquainted with the character of
outdoor Socialist propaganda, their speeches had a familiar ring.’63 And
not all new MPs were devotees of the new style. Henry Snell made a
maiden speech in which he spoke of the enduring spell that the
Commons had first cast on him as a boy when he witnessed Gladstone
in action from the gallery.64 (Ironically, of course, Gladstone had been
seen by critics in his own time as a demagogue, although Snell was a
believer in restraint.) Other moderate figures, such as John Hodge,
though, were prepared to defend the Clydesiders. In his memoirs,
Hodge (who had served as a minister in the wartime Lloyd George
59 ‘Frightfulness in Parliament’, Morning Post, 25 November 1922.
60 See e.g. ‘Lobby Notes by the New ‘MP’ ’, The Popular View, January 1923; and F. John
Sherwood, ‘If Socialists Ruled’, The Popular View, May 1923. The quotation comes from
‘Personalities’, The Man in the Street, August 1924.
61 For the evolution of ideas about the politics of masculinity, see K. Good, ‘ ‘‘Quit Ye
Like Men’’: Platform Manliness and Electioneering, 1895–1939’, in M. McCormack, ed.,
Public Men: Masculinity Politics in Modern Britain (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2007), 143–64;
and M. Francis, ‘Tears, Tantrums, and Bared Teeth: The Emotional Economy of Three
Conservative Prime Ministers, 1951–1963’, Journal of British Studies, 41 (2002), 354–87.
62 S. Ball, ‘Parliament and Politics in Britain, 1900–1951’, Parliamentary History, 10
(2008), 243–76, at 266.
63 Snowden, Autobiography Vol. 2, 577.
64 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 159, 30 November
1922, col. 1037.
14 RICHARD TOYE
 at U
niversity of Exeter on June 20, 2014
http://tcbh.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
coalition) noted that these men were ‘filled with the emotions created as
the result of the hardships and the miseries which they have observed
and lived amongst’. It was no wonder, then, he thought, that they lost
patience with the ‘deliberate wasting of time in tedious speech making’
that took place in the Commons. He asked: ‘Who can blame earnest
men when sometimes this waste of time is the cause of angry scenes.’65
The radical Labour MP E. D. Morel, who was one of the new intake,
also invoked the issue of class, although he himself was not from a
working background: ‘The hideous abuses and injustices which conceal
themselves beneath the pomp and venerability of these ancient
institutions and solemn pageantries of ours are being revealed in
their nakedness by men who live among them.’66 Arthur Ponsonby MP
(son of Queen Victoria’s private secretary) was another who claimed
that the Labour influx had brought new life to the Commons,
contrasting the current atmosphere to the ‘bogus Parliament’ headed by
‘the Dictator Prime Minister’ Lloyd George in 1918–22.67
As these examples of Labour discourse surrounding Commons
behaviour suggest, the class dynamics of the PLP were complex. The
new influx of Labour MPs had substantially increased the working-
class element in the Commons. At the same time, even as their numbers
increased, the percentage of Labour MPs from working backgrounds
declined, as the party gained recruits from (in particular) middle-class
ex-Liberals.68 These complexities were often lost on (or ignored by)
Labour’s critics. However, although it was often suggested that the
party’s behaviour in Parliament was evidence of its unfitness to govern,
the response to breaches of convention was often one of patronizing
amusement rather than genuine outrage. According to one Coalition
Liberal MP, ‘when honourable members are addressed as ‘‘dear
friends’’ it is asking too much not to expect vocal smiles’.69 One cartoon
in The Popular View showed ‘The Socialist Party’ as a puppy, tearing up
the pages of Erskine May’s Parliamentary Practice.70 The implication was
that, although it was doing damage, it would in due course grow up
and become house-trained. Labour MPs were thus belittled as being in
need of correction and ridiculed by the suggestion that they would not
be able to avoid being ‘taken in hand’.71 For its part, The Liberal
65 J. Hodge, Workman’s Cottage to Westminster, (London, 1931), 155–6.
66 E. D. Morel, ‘First Impressions of Westminster and the Party’, New Leader, 1
December 1922.
67 A. Ponsonby, ‘In the New Parliament’, New Leader, 8 December 1922.
68 M. Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868: From Gentlemen to Players
(Oxford, 2001).
69 G. H. Shakespeare, ‘Impressions of the New Parliament’, British Weekly, 14 December
1922.
70 ‘Puppyhood’, The Popular View, January 1923.
71 For variants on this theme, see cartoons in the February and March 1923 issues of
The Popular View.
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Magazine criticized the ‘theatrical Performance’ by Labour members on
13 December 1922 when they made repeated interjections demanding to
know what the government was going to do to help the unemployed:
‘the Labour Members were already in possession of the information
which they were now demanding with mock indignation and assumed
despair’.72
The criticism offered by Labour opponents was important because it
shaped the environment in which MacDonald and his critics operated.
Laura Beers has suggested that ‘the hysterical representation of socialist
politics by Labour’s opponents helped to reinforce pre-existing
tendencies towards gradualism, parliamentarism and financial ortho-
doxy within the movement, as party and trade union leaders shied
away from policies and actions which could be presented as reckless or
unconstitutional’.73 This is correct (although representations often fell
short of ‘hysterical’), but the picture is incomplete. Certainly,
MacDonald found the behaviour of some of his MPs problematic.74
In public he emphasized that Labour would solve unemployment ‘By
the exercise of wisdom, not of fists’, and contrasted the disciplined
PLP he wanted to build with the supposedly ‘slap-dash’ methods of
his critics.75 However, he was not powerful enough to make all of
his followers behave as he wished. Therefore, he played them on a
long leash, leading to the Conservative accusations that he was a
‘complacent’ leader, who could have acted to restrain rowdy Labour
MPs but chose not to.76 In addition to laying down the law on
Commons technique, MacDonald simultaneously indulged the fire-
brands and took the fight to the Tories. Thus, in an article for the
Socialist Review early in 1923 he claimed that Labour’s contributions had
revived Parliament and given it a ‘virile vigour’. He also justified some
of the noisy behaviour that had taken place, and threw the blame for it
on to the government. Moreover:
It is sheer nonsense to imagine that there will be no ‘scenes,’ or that
‘scenes’ are never justified, in Parliament. I have never known a
Parliament without its scenes, the ugliest and the most insulting to
the Speaker being that arranged by the Tory Party when the
Parliament Bill [of 1911] was being discussed and the sitting had to
be suspended. For any follower of the Tory or Liberal Party to hold
72 ‘Notes of the Month’, Liberal Magazine, January 1923.
73 L. Beers, ‘Counter-Toryism: Labour’s Response to Anti-Socialist Propaganda’, in
M. Worley, ed., The Foundations of the British Labour Party: Identities, Cultures and
Perspectives, 1900–39 (Farnham, 2009), 231–54. Quotation at 233.
74 Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, 288.
75 ‘Labour Policy’, The Times, 12 February 1923; Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, 291;
A. Morgan, J. Ramsay MacDonald (Manchester, 1987), 91.
76 ‘Lobby Notes By the New ‘MP’ ’, The Popular View, January 1923. See also the cartoon
‘The ‘Leader’ and the ‘Led’ ’ in the same issue.
16 RICHARD TOYE
 at U
niversity of Exeter on June 20, 2014
http://tcbh.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
up horror-stricken eyes to heaven on account of disorderly Labour
Members is only a proof of forgetfulness, of ignorance, or of hypo-
critical humbug.
Just as MacDonald had defended direct action in theory whilst
opposing it in practice, so the real message of this article was that ‘work
in Parliament must be conducted under restraint’. Genuinely spontan-
eous ‘scenes’ were acceptable but it would ‘fatal’ for the PLP to make
them into a habit.77 In private his language was stronger. In July 1923,
he appealed to his MPs ‘for a greater measure of self-restraint and for a
realisation of the fact that when a Labour Government arrives it will be
greatly hampered if, in the meantime, Parliamentary Government has
been destroyed’.78
MacDonald, then, was indeed trying to steer his supporters towards
moderation, his technique for doing so was complex. Lecturing MPs on
the need for disciplined behaviour would have been unlikely to work in
isolation. In order to bring them with him in his attempt to colonize the
middle ground, he had to show, by the exposure of Conservative
double standards, that he was ready to deny it aggressively to Labour’s
opponents. He did not merely assert Labour’s constitutionalist
credentials but contested those of the other parties. Whereas the
Conservatives’ behaviour during the Edwardian period of strife made
them implausible defenders of the constitution, the Liberals were
merely motivated by expediency. Thus: ‘But for the stand which the
Labour party had made for honest politics and proper Parliamentary
action there would be no means for constitutionalism in this country
at the present time.’79 Such an ability to preach gradualism whilst main-
taining robust attacks on Labour’s enemies helps explain MacDonald’s
personal popularity within the party up to 1931, as well as his electoral
success.
The year 1923 witnessed further parliamentary ‘scenes’. The most
spectacular, in April, involved ‘actual scrimmages, and many threats of
violence’, and the singing of The Red Flag. The government had been
defeated the previous day over the question of the treatment of
ex-servicemen entering the civil service, and it was its failure to make
clear how it was going to respond to the defeat that led to the Labour
attempt to prevent the transaction of further business until it did so.
The behaviour was justified with reference to the precedent of a similar
Conservative action against the Liberals in November 1912. As on that
77 J. Ramsay MacDonald, ‘The Party in Parliament’, Socialist Review, January 1923.
78 Minutes of a meeting of the PLP held at Caxton Hall, 3 July 1923. Consulted on
microfilm: The Archives of the Parliamentary Labour Party (Brighton, 1985).
79 ‘Labour Leader’s Vision’, The Times, 3 December 1923.
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occasion, the episode culminated in the Speaker suspending the
sitting.80 (‘Rowdyism’, then, could actually be justified in terms of
‘parliamentary tradition’.) In June, Maxton’s allegation that an aspect of
government welfare policy constituted ‘murder’ led to his suspension
from the Commons, together with three other Clydeside MPs who
backed him up when he refused to withdraw his remark.81 Such events
were presented by Labour’s media machine presented as a sign of its
determination to uphold justice, and by its opponents as a disgraceful
interruption of the House of Commons as it attempted to do ‘the work
of the people’.82
The advent of the short-lived Labour government of 1924 had a
calming effect on the PLP.83 MacDonald tried to make the best of his
lack of a majority by emphasizing the responsibility of MPs to vote
‘as responsible Members of the House and not merely as party
politicians’.84 The New Leader cast this as a new dawn for Parliament.85
In fact, MacDonald became irritated with what he saw as excessive
parliamentary discussion.86 But although the government did suffer
from tensions between ministers and backbenchers, parliamentary
‘scenes’ did not have the same utility for left-wingers as they had done
when Labour was in Opposition. Obstruction now was the preserve
of Liberals and Tories, leading MacDonald to fulminate: ‘unless there is
going to be some sort of ordinary decency in Parliamentary tactics it is
not only the Government which will suffer, but the House of Commons
itself which will be brought into contempt’.87 Naturally, his was a
highly partisan interpretation of ‘ordinary decency’, and after the fall of
the Labour government, his behaviour as Leader of the Opposition
attracted equally partisan criticism from Conservatives.
A 1925 Punch cartoon shows Baldwin (who had replaced Bonar
Law as his party’s leader in 1923) and MacDonald as competing
rugby captains, under the watchful eye of Speaker J. H. Whitley in the
guise of the referee. Baldwin expresses the hope that there won’t be
80 ‘Uproar in The Commons’, The Times, 12 April 1923.
81 ‘Uproar in The Commons’, The Times, 23 June 1923.
82 ‘Notes of the Month’, The Lloyd George Liberal Magazine, May 1923.
83 Stanley Baldwin to George V, 17 January 1924, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 60; A. Ponsonby,
‘On the Eve of Historic Change’, New Leader, 18 January 1924.
84 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. 169, 12 February 1924,
col. 746.
85 ‘The Commons in Power’, New Leader, 15 February 1924.
86 Ramsay MacDonald diary, 2 March 1924, PRO 30/69/1753, The National Archives,
Kew, London (henceforward TNA). Anyone wishing to quote these diaries is obliged to
explain that MacDonald meant them simply ‘as notes to guide and revive memory’ and
did not intend them to be published.
87 ‘Labour in Office: Special Interview with the Prime Minister’, New Leader, 11 April
1924.
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any ‘rough play’ between the teams, and promises a sympathetic
MacDonald: ‘Well, I’ll keep an eye on my right wing if you’ll keep an
eye on your left.’88 The allusion to the role of Whitley (who served from
1921 to 1928) was significant. He received a fair amount of criticism
from Tories for alleged weakness in the face of Labour’s rowdy
behaviour.89 There were some elements of truth in the picture painted
by Punch, but the idea of the Westminster fight being governed by
collusion between the two leaders is short of the mark. It seems
doubtful, in particular, that the Prime Minister felt that MacDonald had
successfully tamed his left-wing. When Parliament was sitting Baldwin
sent daily letters to the King describing and commenting on events
there. These letters were likely drafted for him, but there is no reason
to think that they did not reflect his views, and they are at any rate
a useful source of partisan commentary. One such letter in 1927
complained that ‘The back bench Socialists seem to arrogate to
themselves the right to indulge, both in the House of Commons and
outside it, in the wildest possible statements or accusations of the
most provocative character and calculated to offend both the public
and personal feelings of their opponents. Moreover, notwithstanding
the fact that their violent and abusive tactics have been treated
with quite remarkable patience and conciliation, they explode in
outbursts of rhetorical imagination whenever a Conservative Member is
carried away to the extent of making a provocative or inflammatory
remark.’90
Nonetheless, with some prominent exceptions such as George
Lansbury and Josiah Wedgwood, the PLP shared MacDonald’s view
that it would be counter-productive to attempt to obstruct all
government business, as the IPP had attempted in the late nineteenth
century.91 There was however a more general opinion that some forms
of disruption were acceptable in response to provocation by the other
side. As Conservatives had themselves created major ‘scenes’ before
1914, their criticisms of Labour now could easily be painted as
hypocritical. Thus although MacDonald was strengthening his hold
over his MPs, this was at the price of him continuing to tolerate
some unruly behaviour, and even to defend his supporters against
88 ‘A Fellow Feeling’, Punch, 18 November 1925.
89 See e.g. E. Winterton, Orders of the Day (London, 1953), 107. The criticism was not
unanimous. See Andrew Bonar Law to George V, 14 December 1922, Baldwin Papers,
Cambridge University Library, Vol. 60, and ‘Inside the House’, The Man in the Street, July
1928.
90 Baldwin to George V, 17 February 1927, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 62.
91 Howell, MacDonald’s Party, 29, 35. For contrasting views of the Irish precedent, see
J. Ramsay MacDonald, ‘The Session’, Forward, 23 December 1922, and ‘MPs Should be
Lively’, Lansbury’s Labour Weekly, 28 February 1925.
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excessively strict discipline by the Commons authorities.92 The failure
of the General Strike is rightly seen as the moment that finally put paid
to direct action and moved the unions firmly back towards electoral
politics and the attempt to secure a Labour majority in Parliament.93
There were broader issues of ‘respectability’ surrounding the strike: the
related coal dispute saw considerable emphasis by strikers on their
right to a wage that would allow them to live ‘respectably’.94
The new strategy did not mean quiescence within Parliament itself,
nor an end to the familiar charges that the party was bringing the
Commons into disrepute. In July 1926, the Conservative MP Duff
Cooper alleged that ‘The Opposition are ceasing to be respectable’, a
comment that could have been read as a deadly class insult.95 The
following year a writer in the Liberal Magazine complained about
Labour’s indiscipline: ‘Out of this free-lance business emerges a
continual affirmation of class distinction. Not only is the Labour view
the only one that matters: the working-classes . . . are the only elements
of the nation to be considered by the legislative assembly’.96 Nicholas
Owen has written that on the Labour side Parliament ‘was regarded as
a class-neutral arena’.97 This may have been true of some MPs, but as a
general proposition it seems doubtful, and clearly Labour’s opponents
would not have accepted this account.98 It is perhaps better to say that
Labour saw Parliament as a potentially class-neutral arena, once put to
proper use once the party itself had a majority.
MacDonald was often visibly displeased by his MPs’ behaviour, but
his rebukes of them tended to be indirect, and at times he appeared
even to egg them on.99 One notable outbreak took place in November
1927, when Labour MPs demanded that Baldwin himself, rather than
the responsible minister, give the official reply to an Opposition-
sponsored debate on the coal industry. The uproar when he refused led
to the sitting to be suspended. According to Baldwin’s letter to the
92 For one such episode, see C. Kessler, ed., The Diaries of a Cosmopolitan 1918–1937:
Count Harry Kessler (London, 1999) 255 (entry for 5 March 1925), and Parliamentary
Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. 181, 9 March 1925, col. 1941.
93 See e.g. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, 441–2.
94 See e.g. ‘Miners and the Government’, The Times, 28 August 1926.
95 ‘First Citizen’, ‘The Comedy of Westminster’, Saturday Review, 17 July 1926. For Duff
Cooper’s authorship of this regular column, see his memoirs: Old Men Forget (London,
1954), 144.
96 M. J. Landa, ‘Labour’s Parliamentary Failure’, Liberal Magazine, April 1927.
97 Owen, ‘MacDonald’s Parties’, 52.
98 Aneurin Bevan (first elected 1929) later pointed out that the ‘physical arrangements
outside the Chamber’ were ‘steeped in class bias’. This was a reference to the lack of
office space for MPs; as Bevan explained, the assumption was ‘that Members
of Parliament are well-to-do and possess houses within easy reach of the House of
Commons’: In Place of Fear (London, 1952), 10. See also P. Hastings, The Autobiography
of Patrick Hastings (London, 1948), 229.
99 ‘Political Notes’, The Times, 1 July 1926.
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King, ‘It had all the appearance of being a pre-conceived plan.
Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, in the course of his opening speech, made
repeated allusions to the Prime Minister’s intentions which could have
had no other effect than to stimulate his more irresponsible and
excitable followers and encourage them to take violent action.’ The
letter also noted that Kirkwood ‘caused intense amusement by leaping
excitedly to his feet and asking the Speaker whether his Party were not
acting ‘‘perfectly Parliamentary’’ in their method of procedure’.100
Although ‘one or two firebrands’ such as Kirkwood appear to have
taken the lead in this instance, much of the disruption was carried out
by mining MPs, showing that this type of activity was not the exclusive
preserve of the Clydesiders.101
The concept of ‘perfectly Parliamentary’ disruption is perhaps the
key to understanding Labour MPs’ behaviour. By the time of the 1929
Labour government, there had been a considerable measure of adaption
to the norms of the House of Commons, but it was still often felt
desirable to use disorder to make principled points, albeit within
certain limits. A clear sense of the bounds of acceptability can be gained
from the notorious episode in 1930 in which the ILP MP (and future
fascist) John Beckett seized the Commons mace. Beckett did this in an
attempt to halt the suspension of his colleague Fenner Brockway, who
in turn was defying the Speaker in protest at the government’s refusal
to have a debate on Indian affairs. Beckett did not receive universal
condemnation on the left but the general consensus, expressed by the
New Statesman, was that he had ‘made an idiot of himself’.102 The PLP
voted to condemn his action, by 90 votes to 28.103 Brockway himself felt
that Beckett’s action ‘had destroyed the dignity of the protest and its
purpose’.104 It was permissible to break the rules, then, in a measured
and symbolic way, but such actions had to have their own form of
decorum.
Even before 1929 some Conservatives detected signs that Labour
MPs had ceased scoffing and begun ‘to appreciate the ancient forms
and formulas’ of Parliament.105 Miliband’s account makes much of how
the atmosphere of the Commons turned ‘erstwhile agitators into
subdued parliamentarians’.106 Labour MPs did on the whole adjust to
the formal ceremonial traditions of Parliament, albeit not always with a
100 Baldwin to George V, 17 November 1927, Baldwin Papers, Vol. 62.
101 ‘Coal Debate Burked’, The Times, 17 November 1927.
102 New Statesman, 26 July 1930. Beckett received enthusiastic support from his
constituency party. F. Beckett, The Rebel Who Lost his Cause: The Tragedy of John Beckett, MP
(London, 1999), 95.
103 Minutes of the PLP, 30 July 1930.
104 Beckett, The Rebel Who Lost His Cause, 93.
105 ‘Quill, MP’, ‘Pen Pictures from Parliament’, Home and Politics, November 1928.
106 Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, 95–6.
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sense of uncritical reverence. Jennie Lee found the elaborate procedure
by which new members were obliged to bow to the Speaker to be
‘rather a fantastic way of fighting the class-war’ but submitted to
guidance on how to do it because she was ‘glad enough to be saved
from making any unnecessary blunders’.107
However, some, such as the upper-class future Chancellor Hugh
Dalton, consciously wanted to counteract the perceived danger of
‘Parliamentary creeping paralysis’, and prided themselves on not
socializing with MPs from other parties.108 Moreover, not all ritual went
unchallenged. When Snell proposed the ‘humble address’ in reply to
the 1929 King’s Speech wearing ‘ordinary morning dress’ rather than
the traditional court dress, resisting pressure from his own side to
conform. Snell’s version of Christian Socialism blended radicalism and
puritanism; his self-confessed ‘puritanical bias’ was more important to
him than the strict observance of tradition.109 Nor did the influence of
the Commons always serve to blunt the forcefulness of Labour’s
contributions. After witnessing Duff Cooper’s powerful maiden speech,
E. Rosslyn Mitchell, the Labour MP for Paisley, wrote to congratulate
him: ‘I was told that the House listened only to the peculiar and
irritating style, known as the House of Commons manner, which is
made up of hesitation, eh-ahing and a crowd of cliche´s of the ‘‘venture
to suggest’’, ‘‘make bold to say’’ sort. Now you have proved what I was
told is untrue.’110 Some Labour members continued to breach
convention by delivering controversial maiden speeches, either delib-
erately (as in the case of Herbert Morrison) or because no one had
explained the custom to them (as in that of Leah Manning).111 Oswald
Mosley credited Jack Jones with bringing ‘to an end in the House of
Commons the habit of Latin quotation, which he would invariably greet
with a stentorian roar: ‘‘That is the winner of the two-thirty’’.’112 Labour
MPs, then, did not simply acclimatize themselves to a static culture;
rather, they themselves helped shape the ever-developing informal
conventions of the Commons.
Even more importantly, broad accommodation to established parlia-
mentary forms cannot be straightforwardly conflated with movement to
the political right, as Miliband’s account might perhaps be taken
107 J. Lee, To-Morrow Is A New Day (London, 1939), 124.
108 H. Dalton, ‘First Impressions of Parliament’, New Leader, 2 January 1925; H. Dalton,
Call Back Yesterday: Memoirs 1887–1931 (London, 1953), 256.
109 Lord Snell, Men, Movements and Myself (London, 1936), 226. For the issues
surrounding court dress, see Owen, ‘MacDonald’s Parties’, 15–6.
110 E. Rosslyn Mitchell to D. Cooper, 15 December 1924, quoted in Cooper, Old
Men Forget, 140.
111 H. Morrison, An Autobiography (London, 1960), 95; L. Manning, A Life for Education:
An Autobiography (London, 1970), 88.
112 O. Mosley, My Life (London, 1968), 211.
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to imply. Figures such as Kirkwood and Maxton eventually became
much-loved parliamentary characters, but under the latter’s leadership
in the late 1920s, the ILP swung to the left, alienating many of its more
mainstream members in the process. In 1932 (by which time its
representation in the Commons was reduced to a mere handful) it
disaffiliated from the Labour Party, committing itself to ‘militant
Socialist policies’.113 At the ILP conference of that year, Brockway
declared:
we are living in a fool’s paradise if we think that a majority in
Parliament is enough. Socialist legislation would undoubtedly meet
with resistance, not only from the House of Lords (a minor
obstruction), but from the aristocratic, plutocratic, financial and
capitalist classes generally. Organised action by the working class in
the country would almost certainly be necessary to support the
political action of their representatives in Parliament.114
In other words, ‘perfectly Parliamentary’ behaviour within the precincts
of the Commons did not necessarily equate to strategic parliamentarism
in the sense that MacDonald understood it.
The context for these developments was, of course the 1931 economic
and political crisis, and MacDonald’s perceived betrayal of Labour by
forming the ‘National Government’. The impact on the Labour Party as
a whole was profound, although on the face of it its reaction was
quite different to that of the ILP. It did not revert back towards direct
action or (for the most part) embrace the language of revolution.
Nor, although it saw the National Government as a fraudulent, and
as ‘Virtually a Tory Dictatorship’, did Labour revert to disruptive
parliamentary tactics or ‘scenes’.115 Indeed, with its severely reduced
numbers after the 1931 election, it would have been difficult to generate
the kind of uproar required to make them effective. Meanwhile, there
were on-going tensions between the party conference (theoretically the
body determined all party policy), the PLP (determined to safeguard
its day-to-day independence), and the Trades Union Congress (TUC)
(which was keen to remind Labour’s National Executive that the party
had been ‘created by the Trade Union Movement to do those things in
113 Independent Labour Party, The Report of the Annual Conference Held at Blackpool March,
1932 (London, 1932), 62.
114 ILP, Report of the Annual Conference, 13. This in fact represented a moderate position
within the ILP in contrast to those who saw ‘worker’s councils’ as an alternative to
Parliament, rather than merely as one possible site of struggle: G. Cohen, The Failure of a
Dream: The Independent Labour Party from Disaffiliation to World War II (London, 2007), 113.
115 W. Dobbie’s election address for the Rotheram by-election, 7 February 1933, CPA,
PUB 229/1/6.
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Parliament which the Trade Union Movement found ineffectively
performed by the two-Party system’.)116
It should not be imagined that the Commons of the 1930s was
entirely quiescent. It is striking, though, that in 1935 Baldwin praised
the diminutive PLP for having ‘helped to keep the flag of Parliamentary
government flying’, an easy enough thing to say at a point that it posed
no real threat to his party, of course, but also a token of how
accusations of rowdyism within the Commons were a thing of the
past.117 Ellen Wilkinson, returning to Parliament that same year turned
the death of the earlier style into a virtue, portraying it as a sign of
political ‘seriousness’.118 It might seem, then, that Labour was now fully
confirmed in its parliamentarist respectability.
However, acceptance of the outward forms of conduct notwithstand-
ing, 1931—and the events that led up to it—actually undermined
Labour’s faith in Parliament very considerably. This did not mean, it
should be emphasized, that any of its thinkers or politicians wanted to
abolish it, or that (unlike the ILP) they placed any hope in the
extra-parliamentary route. Rather, they were increasingly doubtful
about the ability of Parliament, in the absence of procedural reform, to
deliver the social and economic transformation that the party desired.
As we have seen, there had, in the past, been a fair measure of interest
in such reform and this continued to some extent in the 1920s. The 1922
party conference accepted a resolution in favour of reform, which was
reflected in that year’s election manifesto. But neither the 1923, 1924, or
1929 manifestos made mention of the idea, even though MacDonald
himself felt the need for greater efficiency. However, the failure of the
second Labour government to tackle unemployment led to growing
doubts the capacity of the parliamentary system as a whole to respond
meaningfully to economic crisis. This was exemplified by the radical
reform proposals of Mosley, who then left Labour to form the New
Party and subsequently the British Union of Fascists. But although
Mosley marginalized himself, some of his key concerns were more
widely shared.119 The political and economic events surrounding the
formation of the National Government enhanced Labour’s sense of the
need for drastic action to dynamize the government machine.
116 Comments of Walter Citrine, minutes of a Joint Meeting of the TUC General Council
and the National Executive Committee, 10 October 1931. Consulted on microfilm: The
Archives of the British Labour Party (Brighton, 1974–9).
117 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. 302, 22 May 1935,
col. 371.
118 E. Wilkinson, ‘Back to the House Again’, Daily Mail, 22 November 1935.
119 B. Webb, A New Reform Bill (Fabian Tract No. 236) (London, 1931); R. Butt, The Power
of Parliament (London, 1969), 129–30; M. Worley, Oswald Mosley and the New Party
(Basingstoke, 2010), 17–21.
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The party’s 1931 manifesto, therefore, promised that Labour would
‘seek such emergency powers as are necessary to the full attainment of
its objectives’. The 1935 version, whilst stressing Labour’s constitution-
alism, pledged both to ‘abolish the House of Lords and improve the
procedure of the House of Commons’.120 The more detailed party
programme For Socialism and Peace (1934) explained that the present
forms of parliamentary government ‘were devised to suit the purposes
of the negative State in the nineteenth century, and are unsuited to the
needs of the positive State in the twentieth’. The ‘old-fashioned
procedure of the House of Commons which facilitates obstruction and
delay’ would therefore be rationalized to expedite the through-put of
government business. The historic rights of the Opposition to criticize,
censure, and discuss were not to be affected, it was said.121
Reforms in this spirit were in due course carried out early in the life
of the Attlee government. Comparatively modest as they were, it may
be thought that they were of no great significance.122 The thinking that
lay behind them, however, was highly revealing of Labour’s post-1931
attitudes. At this time there was growing faith in economic planning
and in the capacity of technocratic experts to carry it out.123 Labourites
in no way saw themselves as wishing to dampen free speech, but they
did think that it was possible to have too much of a good thing. ‘It is of
the essence of democracy that there should be reasonable and adequate,
but not excessive, facilities for Parliamentary discussion’ wrote Dalton.
Moreover, ‘The critic’s contemptuous description of Parliament as a
‘‘talking shop’’ is not unmerited.’124 Discussion was valuable because it
could help improve the details of legislation and hold the executive to
account; but Parliament was fundamentally a mechanism for putting
into effect a broad party platform chosen by the voters, not a forum
for independent-minded MPs to exercise their individual judgements.
Party discipline was therefore the key, and, as Clement Attlee
explained, willingness to subordinate one’s conscience to it was a
sign of one’s acceptance ‘of the fundamental principle of democracy –
majority rule’.125 Such attitudes extended through and beyond the life
120 Labour Party, Report of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference (London, 1922), 239; F. W.
S. Craig, ed., British General Election Manifestos 1918–1966 (Chichester, 1970), 14, 69, 83. For
MacDonald’s views, see ‘Special Report from the Select Committee on Procedure on
Public Business’ (London, 1931), 1–21.
121 Labour Party, For Socialism and Peace: The Labour Party’s Programme of Action (London,
1934). See also Labour Party, Report of the 34th Annual Conference (London, 1934), 261–3.
122 H. Morrison, Government and Parliament: A Survey from the Inside (London, 1954),
206–20.
123 D. Ritschel, The Politics of Planning: The Debate on Economic Planning in Britain in the
1930s (Oxford, 1997); R. Toye, The Labour Party and the Planned Economy, 1931–1951
(London, 2003).
124 H. Dalton, Practical Socialism for Britain (London, 1935), 45–6.
125 C. R. Attlee, The Labour Party in Perspective (London, 1937), 126.
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of the 1945 Labour government. Aneurin Bevan argued in In Place of
Fear (1952) that were Parliament to fail to transfer economic power from
private to public hands it would undermine its own authority, because
‘People have no use for a freedom which cheats them of redress.’ In this
analysis, ‘government by discussion’ was only valuable if it led quickly
to firm action of a particular kind. 126
In the thirties, the more radical expressions of this type of thinking
were associated with Sir Stafford Cripps and his Socialist League.
Cripps’s talk of sweeping emergency powers and of prolonging the life
of a Labour government without an election allowed the Conservatives
to tar Labour with the brush of ‘dictatorship’, Baldwin’s supposed
admiration for the PLP’s parliamentarism notwithstanding. Moderates
in the party and trade union leadership were infuriated, and Cripps’s
comments were repudiated by the official Labour machine.127 Yet, his
Labour opponents themselves wanted stronger powers for ministers.
If the specific reforms to parliamentary procedure that they proposed
were in fact fairly limited, this was partly because they saw ways to
achieve what they wanted by more extensive use of existing techniques,
such as delegated legislation. Indeed, they expressed admiration for
the way that the National Government had used Orders in Council
extensively since 1931; the substance had been wrong but the technique
right. ‘Parliament should settle general principles;’ Dalton wrote.
‘Ministers should settle their detailed application.’128 Respect for
Parliament’s ‘jolt forward’ under the National Government was shared
even on what is sometimes thought of as the sentimental left. ‘The
House is every day becoming more and more like a machine’, observed
Lansbury, the Labour leader from 1931 to 1935. ‘And the House is not
therefore getting more useless, it is daily becoming more and more
efficient.’129
In due course, the Attlee government inherited the sweeping
emergency powers granted to the government by Parliament during the
Second World War. It retained many of them for the purposes of
carrying out its post-war reconstruction programme.130 This was not
wholly uncontroversial, and there was substantial economic decontrol
in the decade after 1945, but some wartime powers ended up on the
126 Bevan, In Place of Fear, 29.
127 Pimlott, Labour and the Left, 50–3; W. Frame, ‘ ‘‘Sir Stafford Cripps and His Friends’’:
The Socialist League, the National Government and the Reform of the House of Lords
1931–1935’, Parliamentary History, 24 (2005), 316–31.
128 Dalton, Practical Socialism, 61.
129 G. Lansbury, Looking Backwards – And Forwards (London, 1935), 89.
130 N. Rollings, ‘ ‘The Reichstag Method of Governing?’ The Attlee Governments and
Permanent Economic Controls’, in H. Mercer et al., eds, Labour Governments and Private
Industry: The Experience of 1945–1951 (Edinburgh, 1992), 15–36.
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statute book permanently.131 This represented a continuation of the
long-standing trend, in train since at least the First World War, whereby
the executive (and, arguably, corporatist interest groups) gained power
at the expense of the legislature.132 Labour ministers presented their
methods as a modern, streamlined, technique for dealing with the
growing mass of complex business: they and their officials could take
care of details, Parliament would retain broad oversight.133 And,
doubtless, they and many other Labour members maintained a sincere
love of the House of Commons as an institution. (However, the
puritanical streak which disapproved of pomp continued to find
support amongst a minority of MPs for many decades, and likely
generated considerable resonance with many ordinary party members.)
Nonetheless, it is possible to reach the conclusion that Parliament was
now increasingly regarded by the party’s leaders mainly as a useful
mechanism for processing a legislative programme, that is to say as an
adjunct to the strong Cabinet government that would allow Labour to
deliver on its electoral ‘mandate’. None of them would have denied the
importance of debate; but they thought that Parliament’s central
purpose was to do things, not to talk about them. From today’s
perspective that view may seem wholly unexceptional. It contrasted,
though, with an alternative vision—ably voiced by the Labour MP
Maurice Webb in 1945—which saw the ‘central function’ of the
Commons ‘as the great forum of public debate on public policy, and a
general clearing house for the people’s aspirations’.134
In conclusion, it is clear that the predominant historiographical
picture of Labour as the repository of a more or less undifferentiated
‘parliamentarism’ is unsatisfactory. It neglects the differing views
within the party on how Parliament was to be used and ignores the
tactical nods that MacDonald was obliged to make towards the
principle of direct action and the use of Commons disruption. The
consequence is that, while some historians have disapproved of
parliamentarism, they have never doubted that MacDonald was the
quintessential embodiment of it. Yet, there is an argument to be made
that in fact his confidence in Parliament as a part of a rational public
sphere was rather limited. He may have been influenced by his
memories of wartime xenophobia in 1899–1902 and 1914–8. He saw
little innate value in parliamentary speech, which he saw as a
distraction from meaningful activity. ‘I dread H. of C. speechifying
131 R. Norton-Taylor et al., Knee Deep in Dishonour: The Scott Report and its Aftermath
(London, 1996), 41.
132 Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society.
133 Morrison, Government and Parliament, 150–4.
134 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. 415, 15 November 1945,
col. 2371. Emphasis added.
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more than ever’, he wrote in his diary in 1929. ‘Foolishly I moan: ‘‘Why
must a P.M. speak who wants to do work?’’ ’ Encouraged by the Labour
press, his own backbenchers talked too much, and when he talked the
Liberals and Conservatives would not listen to him.135 ‘Herbert, I hate
this place’, he once commented to Herbert Morrison as they sat together
on the Treasury Bench—an understandable feeling, perhaps, given his
government’s difficulties.136
By contrast, many of the new Labour MPs came to Parliament
vesting enormous hope in it. They may not have been truly convinced
that they were going to persuade their opponents in the Commons
through debate, or indeed have expected to have their own minds
changed through the interplay of conflicting ideas. But they did believe
that the Commons chamber was an appropriate pulpit from which to
deliver a form of morally compelling speech that would awaken the
country to the plight of the working classes. This was not just the
preserve of the Clydesiders. ‘We can make the House of Commons a
sounding-board for words of hope that shall reach that greater audience
outside’, wrote Dalton in 1925.137 Presented by Labour’s enemies as a
form of populist demagoguery, to its proponents the type of speech
would give a new vitality to Parliament. In the simplest terms, they
believed that the things they did within the walls of the Commons
would actually change things.
In that sense of the word, then, the 1920s were Labour’s true
parliamentarist moment. Disillusion did not long follow. Bevan was
first elected in 1929. His later account of the Labour member’s typical
experience of delivering a maiden speech is extremely telling:
Having come straight from contact with his constituents, he is full of
their grievances and his own resentment, and naturally, he does his
best to shock his listeners into some realisation of it.
He delivers himself therefore with great force and, he hopes and
fears, with considerable provocativeness. When his opponent arises
to reply he expects to hear an equally strong and uncompromising
answer. His opponent does nothing of the sort. In strict conformity
with Parliamentary tradition, he congratulates the new Member
upon a most successful maiden speech and expresses the urbane
hope that the House will have frequent opportunities of hearing
him in the future . . . the new member crawls out of the House with
feelings of deep relief at having got it over, mingled with a
135 MacDonald diary, 2 July 1929, as well as the entry for 3 December 1924, PRO 30/69/
1753, TNA.
136 Morrison, Government and Parliament, 170.
137 Dalton, ‘First Impressions of Parliament’, 2 January 1925.
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paralysing sense of frustration. The stone he thought he had thrown
turned out to be a sponge.138
Neither such experiences nor the crisis of 1931 turned Labour against
Parliament; but never again would the party place such confidence
in it.139 They did not at all give up the belief that a Labour government
with a parliamentary majority could genuinely transform society. But
they no longer felt that it was Commons speeches that would make
the difference. (This complicates Lawrence’s claim that ‘Most inter-war
politicians wanted to substitute a deliberative for a demonstrative
model of citizenship’: Labour was certainly demonstrative in
Parliament in the twenties, but it also placed a higher value on speech
then that it did later.)140 In 1945 the old hands explained to the
newcomers that their contribution was to be negligible: ‘Keep mum,
and let the Bills get through.’141 Baldwin is said to have seen his role in
relation to the Labour Party as to ‘instruct the new arrivals in the
limitations of parliamentary government’.142 It is indeed fair to say
that the inter-war experience taught Labour not the possibilities of
Parliament but its limits.
138 Bevan, In Place of Fear, 7.
139 Of course, every new intake of MPs experiences some form of frustrated optimism;
but no subsequent generation has placed such faith in Parliament (even in the absence
of a Commons majority), as distinct from vesting hopes in a newly elected Labour
government.
140 J. Lawrence, Electing Our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair
(Oxford, 2009), 128.
141 J. Mann, Woman in Parliament (London, 1962), 13.
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